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MAJOR RAILWAY WORKS IN HONG KONG - ON 
TIME & WITHIN BUDGET TO OPERATING SUCCESS 
 
James BLAKE, OBE, JP 
Fellow, Institution of Civil Engineers (Gold Medal 1997) 
 
ABSTRACT: Kowloon Canton Railway Corporation (KCRC), a wholly Government owned entity, standing 
alone, is required by law to produce a return on investment based upon prudent commercial principles. In this 
paper KCRC’s successful on time and within budget approach to constructing US$9.4 billion of new railway 
works over a time span of eight years, is described in the context of risk allocation between the Employer and 
Contractors compatible with International practice. Contract awards were made after competitive tendering fully 
in accordance with the World Trade Organization rules applicable to procurement by Government agencies. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In November 1994, the Governor of Hong Kong 
decided to proceed with the Western Corridor Railway, 
and in the following January, KCRC were invited to 
submit proposals to build and operate the railway. 
This had been preceded by findings of the 
Government’s Railway Development Strategy from 
the late 1980’s onwards. 
 
The original brief was for three rail services to be 
provided, namely a domestic service for Northwest 
New Territories residents, a cross-border rail service 
from the Guangdong Province of southern China to 
the Kwai Chung Container Port in Hong Kong, and a 
cross-border passenger line. The alignment of the 
railway is much the same as that we see today.  
 
In 1993, 40 million cross-border passenger trips were 
recorded, a number that was forecast to double in 10 
years. During 2003, there were in fact about 120 
million passenger trips across the boundary between 
the Hong Kong SAR, and Guangdong/Shenzhen. 
 
KCRC was a natural choice to build and operate this 
new railway, having been in existence since the year 
1910 when it opened for traffic with two steam 
locomotives for mainline operation and a further two 
for shunting purposes. In September 1963, the last 
steam locomotive was scrapped, being replaced with 
diesel-electric locomotives from 1955 onwards. Diesel 
became the backbone of the KCRC passenger and 
freight services between Lo Wu at the boundary and 
the Hung Hom terminus in Kowloon, until the 
electrification programme was completed in stages 
during 1982-1983.  
 
The KCRC electric trains were configured in 12-car 
consists, each train receiving power from the overhead 
25-kV, 50 Hz single phase supply operating up to a 
maximum speed of 120 km/hr. During the early days 
of operating the electric railway, occasional service 
interruptions occurred when the overhead catenary 
system was disrupted by arcing at transformer 
locations. This was subsequently designed out of the 
system by relying principally upon ground-earth 
return to the main traction power supply transformers. 
An advantage of the 25kV system was compatibility 
with the system adopted by China, since it was 
expected that trains would again resume services 
between Hung Hom and Guangdong, the original 
Kowloon-Canton railway.  
 
In fact through train services did recommence from 
early 1980’s onwards. In addition to the domestic 
service along East Rail, KCRC receive freight trains 
from China into Hung Hom drawn by diesel 
locomotives.  
 
From 1988 onwards, KCRC began operating a Light 
Rail service in the north and western parts of the New 
Territories linking the new town areas between Tuen 
Mun and Yuen Long. 
 
2. RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT 
KCRC had been seeking to enhance its rail freight 
capability from 1991 onwards, with a port passenger 
line proposal to the Government in 1993 and building 
on this for the Western Corridor Railway detailed 
feasibility study culminating in its full proposals to the 
Government during 1995. By April 1996, a total of 
US$55 million had been spent on proposals leading to 
West Rail, involving banking, legal and land 
specialists, apart from its core consultants. Given the 
status of the project, however, the West Rail Division 
comprised mainly project consultant contract staff.  
 
During this period of planning, the primary factors 
behind the viability of the railway were revenues from 
passengers and freight, involving passenger trip 
models, fare assumptions, and the attractiveness of a 
rail freight service in and out of southern China. 
Despite the integrated nature of the approach taken, it 
was clear from the forecasts that the commercial 
viability of the railway would be satisfactory only 
with the inclusion of freight services. To provide a 
better base for viability calculation, it was also 
assumed that property development would take place 
along the railway with income flowing to the 
Corporation. 
 
 Passenger forecasts were based on the same 
assumptions adopted by the Government for its own 
railway development studies, assuming a 1992 travel 
pattern and a conservative population forecast of 7.5 
million in mid-2000. Of particular importance, the 
population in the north and west parts of the New 
Territories would increase by about one-third which 
would represent the major part of Hong Kong’s 
population growth. 
 
Cross-border passenger trips were expected to grow at 
an annual rate of about 5 per cent, considered a 
conservative projection.  
 
In November 1996, the Governor-in-Council 
responded to the proposals from KCRC by deciding 
that a new railway known as West Rail would be built 
in phases with the First Phase extending from Tuen 
Mun, through the new towns of the west and north 
parts of the New Territories, linking with the urban 
area by way of a long section in tunnel with an initial 
terminal station in West Kowloon. RDS I also 
identified the need to enhance the capacity of East 
Rail for passenger services, and to provide a second 
crossing for rail passengers into Shenzhen, the Special 
Economic Zone which neighbours the territory.  
 
The Government conducted a second Railway 
Development Study which was made public in 1998 
alongside various studies related to road development 
in the territory and additional crossings into southern 
China. 
 
Government’s stated aim was to bring railway travel 
within easy reach of Hong Kong’s entire population, 
using both KCRC services, and those of the Mass 
Transit Railway Corporation which runs broadly from 
east to west, either side of the harbour and the new 
airport with the urban area and central business 
districts. 
 
KCRC’s envisaged programme of capital projects was 
expected to lead to a ridership of 2.2 million by 2008, 
about double the combined East Rail and Light Rail 
ridership at the commencement of West Rail. This 
would mean KCRC route length increasing by 140 per 
cent, and an increase in average Net Fixed Assets of 
40 per cent. The book value of assets was forecast to 
increase by a factor of about 5 times over the period, 
with a substantial part of this funded by borrowings, 
resulting in the net book position. 
 
3. THE CHALLENGES 
Given that Hong Kong is one of the most-densely 
populated cities in the world, major difficulties were 
foreseen in acquiring the necessary land for the project 
involving almost 1,000 lots in private ownership, 
necessitating the enactment of a new railway 
Ordinance under which land could be acquired 
expeditiously, subject to a period of about one year for 
gazettal, objections and statutory approval for 
compulsory purchase. Of particular concern was the 
impact on the community at large arising from the 
construction and operating noise of the railway, given 
that the railway alignment would cross a relatively 
rural part of the territory between the growing new 
townships, with much of the area crisscrossed by 
drainage channels and subject to the risk of flooding 
during heavy rainfalls. Rainfalls can exceed 300 mm 
per hour in localized areas. It was decided  therefore 
that the railway would run entirely above ground to 
minimize land and community impacts in the north 
and western parts of the New Territories, running 
above major drainage channels and at locations where 
no other option was available due to ground-level 
constraints.  
 
Viaducts also avoided disrupting existing road 
transportation corridors, and maximized the 
opportunity for connectivity between rail and road 
users at the above ground stations. As we shall see 
later, the adoption of railway viaducts and appropriate 
technology also made it possible for West Rail to be 
designed in compliance with the very strict Noise 
Control Ordinance which was already in place, and 
the Environmental Impact Ordinance which was 
enacted in April 1998. These Ordinances are amongst 
the strictest in the world in terms of protecting the 
community from noise and intrusive impacts, 
particularly so for the New Territory section of West 
Rail, much of which, runs through areas identified as 
rural by nature and therefore much more sensitive to 
railway noise intrusion.   
 
Property development, having been identified as an 
important factor underlining operational viability, 
envisaged a construction of perhaps 44,000 homes 
over a seven-year period in proximity to or above 
West Railway followed by similar property 
development along other new railway lines. Apart 
from property sales providing revenue to fund the 
capital expenditure on the railway, residents in these 
new homes were expected to be an important source 
of patronage for the new railway. The number of new 
homes would also be a significant contribution to 
Government’s long-term housing strategy that was in 
force at that time.  
 
Interconnectivity between KCRC and the existing or 
envisaged transportation links can be categorized 
under three headings. Firstly the stations provide 
direct passenger interchanges between existing 
railways, and all stations are provided with means of 
easy access for passengers arriving or departing by 
taxis, buses and cars. Under the second heading, 
provision was made for West Rail to accept freight 
services from China via a future Northern Link from 
Lo Wu connecting with West Rail just before entering 
the underground section. The third heading covers the 
southern section with direct connections into MTRC 
 stations, and separately ground level facilities for 
passengers using taxis, buses and cars at East Rail 
Extension links. 
 
4. TECHNICAL STUDIES 
During 1997, the alignment and design of the railway 
was progressed by a further series of technical studies 
up to the stage of about 25 per cent scheme design 
completion. This enabled a project to be fixed in terms 
of a capital expenditure budget, the acquisition of land, 
funding cost and pre-revenue operation expenditure 
prior to passenger services. This was fixed at US$ 8.3 
billion in Money of the Day (MOD) terms, taking into 
account a forecast inflationary trend over the likely 
seven years to project completion.  
 
The operation and planning parameters adopted for 
the detailed design studies were based upon the 
existing East Rail and 12-car train consists for 
convergence with an ultimate KCRC network for 
passenger and freight services. The successful design 
and procurement of a safety critical system for train 
control and signaling, was recognized as a dominant 
critical factor from the start of project implementation. 
The process adopted for the procurement of the train 
control system for West Rail was a “funnel” 
procurement approach. KCRC invited expressions of 
interest from suppliers based on system concepts, and 
potential suppliers then responded to the 
Corporation’s system concepts by way of a formalized 
documentation process backed up by computer 
simulations. A fixed sum was paid to those who were 
not invited to proceed and three suppliers were 
eventually invited to tender for the train control and 
signaling contracts against very clearly specified 
system requirements. The funnel process decision and 
the activities involved occupied much of the first year, 
but enabled certainty to be injected into the operating 
characteristics of the railway at the stage when the 
resulting benefits would be of maximum value to the 
heavy civil engineering design which followed.  
 
By the end of this first year, the technical study 
programme had been substantially completed, and five 
engineering consultants were appointed to proceed 
with the detailed design of West Rail leading to the 
preparation of the tender documents. Each consultant 
was awarded a contract in competition with at least 
four other consultants on a pre-qualified list of 
consultants, submitting lump-sum proposals for 
design services on the one part against a clear brief of 
services to be provided. By this time, the Government 
had become concerned that the increase in 
cross-boundary travel would eventually create 
problems for the existing East Rail, and requested 
KCRC to commence technical studies which would 
lead to the East Rail Extensions being undertaken in 
parallel with West Rail. 
 
5. KCRC TAKE CONTROL 
Given the scale and complexity of the project, it was 
essential that strong and effective leadership was 
exercised at all times by the KCRC Management 
Board represented by the CEO and a Capital Projects 
Group led by the Senior Director with strong input 
from the operating divisions of KCRC, and direct 
control by the West Rail Division. A specialist land 
consultant was engaged to provide expert staff for all 
aspects of the land delivery programme, except those 
matters which had to be dealt with by the Lands 
Department of the Government as statutory 
procedures.  
 
The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) which 
was a deliverable from the technical study phase was a 
foundation document for the designers to develop the 
technical solutions and construction methods 
satisfying the construction phase and operational noise 
constraints. A further deliverable from the technical 
study phase was the West Rail General Conditions of 
Contracts and the draft specifications for capital works 
and railway systems. Reference was made to similar 
documentation used in Hong Kong projects by the 
Government, the Mass Transit Railway Corporation 
and the Airport Authority. All of these documents 
embrace the doctrine of fair allocation of risk between 
the Employer and the Contractors, which is enshrined 
in the FIDIC Conditions of Contract. The adoption of 
FIDIC principles enables KCRC to attract a broad 
base of highly experienced International contractors, 
as well as local contractors, when inviting tenders for 
construction of the new railways.  
 
Let me just remind you of the FIDIC principles. The 
conditions were published for the first time in 1957 
and are recognized by international agencies such as 
WTO and the World Bank for procurement of major 
construction works. The conditions are intended to 
fairly allocate risk and responsibilities between the 
parties involved, including independent administration 
of the contract through the construction phase. As we 
can see from this slide, the relationship between the 
client and the contractors in terms of risk allocation, 
varies widely. KCRC chose to adopt a lump sum 
approach with fixed price tender subject to measure 
variations if so instructed.  
 
The background to this was the obvious need to avoid 
the causes of project under-performance such as these 
which are set down on this slide. A strong KCRC 
team would at all times be proactive in dealing with 
the relationship between the Engineer supervising 
construction and the Contractors. In this respect, the 
KCRC Conditions of Contract clearly describe the 
KCRC Project Team’s involvement, differing 
somewhat from the FIDIC relationship between 
Employer and Contractors which was considered 
unnecessarily passive. The adoption by KCRC of the 
team approach for West Rail and the East Rail 
 Extensions was a major factor in the successful 
accomplishment of new railway construction.  
 
A multi-contract approach was adopted to ensure that 
the Corporation had maximum visibility over the 
performance of contractors and the work in progress. 
KCRC’s strong client-based organization was able to 
ensure real time co-ordination and leadership from the 
highest level. Given that KCRC had not previously 
built stations of the complexity needed for West Rail, 
a fully designed approach was adopted. Consultant 
designers provided working drawings for civil works, 
building services, architectural building services and 
finishing works.  The contractors were obliged to 
provide for the integration of works by the system 
specialist contractors within the station public and 
back-of-house areas. 
 
6. CONTRACT AWARDS 
KCRC approach to the award of contract was one of a 
proactive partnership backed up by a fair and 
equitable process, both the tendering process and 
assessment was as transparent as possible. The 
Corporation’s Managing Board was the authority for 
approving all contract awards. Contract documents 
clearly describe how the construction risks would be 
dealt with by KCRC and its contractors.  In the event 
of a dispute arising during the construction of works, 
the documents also described how these would be 
dealt with whilst construction was in progress, 
including the variation process by which the 
contractors would be fairly paid for works found to be 
outside the tender documents.  
 
Contractors having been pre-qualified were required 
to submit a tender in full conformity with the 
drawings and specifications attached to the tender 
documents, failure to do so resulting in automatic 
rejection of the tender. Having done so, however, 
contractors were allowed to tender alternative 
proposals fully priced in the manner required for 
conforming tenders, but taking advantage of a 
contractor special expertise. 
 
For civil construction, the majority of contracts were 
awarded by way of fixed lump sum against detailed 
drawings for construction prepared by the design 
consultants. Since the design risk was with KCRC, the 
Corporation also accepted unforeseen risks that might 
emerge, for example, unexpected ground conditions. 
Special civil works such as tunneling and railway 
system works including signaling and track works, 
were awarded by way of Design and Build Contracts. 
For these better contracts, since the design was 
undertaken by the contractors or specialist designers 
employed by the contractors, the design remained with 
the contractors, and any unexpected ground conditions 
or similar unforeseen risks were for the contractors to 
find design solutions.  
 
Contracts had provisions for variations, and to 
facilitate this all contractors tendering were required 
to submit a schedule of rates and major quantities, 
which was subsequently incorporated into the relevant 
contract.  
 
7. CONSTRUCTION HIGHLIGHTS 
The size and complexity of designing and constructing 
the West Rail above ground stations, was a daunting 
challenge to everyone involved. Tuen Mun Station is 
an example illustrating the sheer size and impact of 
building the station in an established new town area, 
above an existing drainage channel, the width of 
which can be seen in the distance. This resulted in 
many programme and construction constraints 
especially to minimize the risk of flooding. The 
adjacent homes and schools also had to be protected at 
source from noise impacts resulting in strict control 
and limitations upon working outside the normal day 
time hours. The ground level areas for the future 
passenger bus terminal can be seen together with 
access ramp to concourse level, taxi and car drop-off 
areas. Light Rail which crosses the station at its far 
end and runs in close proximity to one side, was raised 
above existing level and connected into the station at 
concourse level, both for passenger convenience and 
to improve road junction flow characteristics. The 
viaduct approach to the station, as at other discreet 
locations along the railway, is enclosed to contain 
noise impact.  
 
Tin Shui Wai Station is another example, this time 
illustrating the problem of building above an existing 
road junction and Light Rail, with a school in close 
proximity. In common with other stations, the 
platform area is enclosed by platform screen doors, 
which open and close together with the train doors, 
enabling trains to stand alongside the platform in an 
open air environment, and thereby reducing the with 
of the station box.  
 
Kam Sheung Road Station was built on a green field 
site following land resumption in Kam Tin Valley for 
the West Rail Depot. The station is surrounded by a 
large transport interchange and a vehicle carpark area 
for passengers from surrounding areas using ground 
transport.  
 
During the Environmental Impact Study for West Rail, 
the problem relating to railway noise, both during 
construction and operation, became a serious issue. 
Within enclosed stations, operating noise could be 
contained. However, the problem of operating a 
railway within a completely contained viaduct, some 
30.5 km in length, was clearly unacceptable from the 
KCRC point of view and brought with it safety related 
issues, particularly should emergency situations arise.  
 
The original viaduct design was developed with noise 
control measures in view. An important part of this 
 approach was the design of the rolling stock itself, 
which incorporated skirts along the whole length of 
each carriage to form a noise plenum under the train, 
with areas of the underside at bogie locations covered 
with sound absorbent material and special noise 
reduction measures provided for the air-conditioning 
units mounted at roof level. The pass-by level for the 
train was specified not to exceed 83 dB(A) on 
ballasted tracks at 130 kph. In the event the 
multi-plenum noise containment system for the 
viaduct section proved satisfactory, except at a few 
locations where the line of sight to sensitive receivers 
resulted in slight excedence of the Noise Control 
Ordinance limits for very early morning operation. At 
the receivers, these noise limits range from 60-65 
dB(A), and were finally achieved by introducing 
plenum enhancement measures at rail track level 
coupled with additional noise barrier protection along 
the top of the viaduct parapets.  
In designing the viaducts, the approach taken was to 
maximize constructability, including parallel work on 
foundations and superstructure to minimize overall 
programme duration for viaduct decks to be available 
for the following contractors. At the same time, the 
Corporation realized that contractors would propose 
alternative designs and these were accepted at the time 
of tender, subject to tenderers   demonstrating that 
the alternative provided equivalent noise and vibration 
reduction performance. In the event an alternative 
design for the viaduct was accepted. 
 
Apart from the design characteristics of the viaduct to 
absorb train generated noise and vibration, special 
track work system along the whole railway was 
employed. This involved considerable research into 
floating slab systems then under construction or in 
operation, particularly by the railway authority 
Toronto, Canada. Sections of floating slabs had 
previously been employed in Hong Kong by MTRC, 
but the West Rail system was by far the longest and 
most ambitious length of such track undertaken 
anywhere at that time. Apart from design 
consideration, the construction of the floating slab 
tracks along 90 per cent of the 30.5 km railway was 
seen as a potential programme risk, but in the event 
the contractors involved developed an effective 
method of construction which enabled the permanent 
way to be completed and commissioned in good time 
for the following railway system contractors.  
 
The innovative solutions for environmental 
performance and noise control adopted for West Rail 
were also adopted and enhanced for East Rail 
Extensions. 
 
8. TUNNEL DESIGN 
From Kam Sheung Road Station and after passing 
through the Maintenance Centre, the railway is 
entirely in tunnel for the remaining 9 kilometres to the 
present terminus station at Nam Cheong. The first 
length was driven by conventional rock tunnel 
methods, and at 5.5 km. it is the longest transportation 
tunnel in Hong Kong. The contractors’ alternative 
design, which was accepted, adopted a single tunnel 
approach with a center-wall to provide the necessary 
separation between the tracks,   four hours of fire 
protection, and passenger evacuation. 
  
The section of tunnel after Tsuen Wan West again was 
a contractor alternative design, using over part of its 
length “Earth-pressure-balanced tunnel boring 
technology”. At 8.4-metre external diameter, this was 
the largest tunnel boring machine ever employed in 
Hong Kong, and successfully overcame a potential 
major programme delay which arose in resuming a 
large multi-occupant industrial building that straddled 
the route of the tunnel. Apart from this the ability to 
tunnel at shallow depth in the decomposed soil and 
rock conditions, without serious disturbance at ground 
level, avoided cut-and-cover construction that 
otherwise would have impacted on the existing major 
roads and footpaths above the tunnel alignment. 
 
9. STATION DESIGN 
Mei Foo Station is located within a public park, and in 
part below an existing major road viaduct structure 
with the soffit of the viaduct serving as the roof of the 
rail tunnel at this location. The alignment places the 
railway about 20 metres from Mei Foo Estate, a large 
residential complex. The resulting community 
problems required intensive communications relations 
by the project team, supported by the KCRC corporate 
relations team.  
 
Mei Foo and Nam Cheong stations are major 
interchange stations between West Rail and the Mass 
Transit Railway, with interchanging passengers also to 
use fully air-conditioned routes with escalators at 
change of levels. Barrier free access is provided 
throughout the new railway for those who are 
visually-impaired, or unable to walk. Lifts are 
provided from platform to concourse levels and where 
necessary to public transport interchange facilities. At 
Nam Cheong Station, KCRC and MTRC came 
together to design the station as the first combined 
station in Hong Kong, serving both rail networks, with 
the station being controlled jointly from a single 
control room. Passengers using Octopus contactless 
travel cards move between the two rail networks, 
through a single set of automatic gates.  
 
Architectural building finishing work for the station 
interior in general adopts the MTRC experience with 
concourse and platform floors finished with 
resin-bond terrazzo tiles, and vertical wall surfaces are 
covered with vitreous enamel panels. Ceiling systems 
generally comprise absorbent panels which drop down 
for ease of maintenance with space for light fittings, 
public address speakers and the like. All level changes 
are provided with escalators with adequate capacity 
 for peak hour travel and emergency evacuation. 
Station signage also received particular attention given 
the size and the number of destination points 
surrounding the West Rail stations in particular. The 
security system throughout the railway is directly 
accessible by the dedicated police unit from the Hong 
Kong Police Force, which patrols the railway 
networks. 
 
10. TESTING AND COMMISSIONING 
The testing and commissioning of all railway systems 
and the rolling stock was designed into the systems 
from commencement, and proceeded as intended up to 
and including pre-revenue trial operation. The 
outbreak of SARS during the early part of 2003 
presented a number of challenges to be overcome, 
since this period had been programmed for completion 
of the field testing and commissioning phase, 
particularly integrating systems installed by different 
contractors. The commissioning of the bus 
interchange facilities requiring the introduction or 
re-routing of bus services, re-scheduling Light Rail 
services and staged opening the new Light Rail 
platforms for passenger use. The traveling public at 
large was informed by way of various Government 
departments and KCRC of the arrangements to be in 
place for the opening of West Rail by way of a fully 
co-ordinated media campaign.  
 
During the trial running and pre-revenue phase which 
preceded the opening of West Rail in December 2003, 
initial difficulties resulting from EMI and ground 
current effects primarily on the signaling and 
train-borne control systems had to be overcome. This 
required a concentrated team effort over a period of 
six weeks, involving contractors and KCRC staff. 
Punctuality and delivery targets for operating the 
railway were set at 95% and 97% consistently, before 
the decision was taken to open for public services. 
Since the opening of the railway, these percentages 
have climbed to over 99.5%, a remarkable 
achievement for a new railway of this nature. Two 
new lines of East Rail Extensions were opened in 
2004, and the lessons learnt from West Rail have been 
applied to very good effect in both the construction 
and operation of these new railways. 
 
11. ON TIME AND WITHIN BUDGET 
West Rail was successfully opened ahead of the date 
set by the Government at the commencement of the 
project, and the original capital cost budget of US$8.3 
billion was reduced to US$6 billion. A substantial 
reduction in cost was achieved in 1998 by means of a 
value engineering exercise at the detailed design stage. 
When it became obvious that cost estimates were 
forecast to increase to an unacceptable level, a major 
value engineering exercise led to the reduction of train 
lengths from 12 cars to 9 cars maximum. This alone 
resulted in shorter stations, and substantial cost 
savings. 
 
In summary, the approach to West Rail can be 
considered a success, particularly since it was the first 
major project to be undertaken by KCRC for very 
many years, and indeed was the largest civil 
engineering project in Hong Kong since the new 
airport. The Quarterly Review Meetings (QRM’s) 
introduced by KCRC are recognized as a major 
contributory factor, a partnering approach which is the 
most effective means of undertaking major projects. 
The QRM’s were conducted both formally in opening 
sessions as well as in closed-door workshops. The 
involvement of KCRC’s construction and operation 
staff in problem solving with designers and 
contractors has been beneficial for both West Rail and 
East Rail Extensions. 
 
East Rail Extensions are likewise ahead of programme 
with two out of three extension lines already serving 
the pubic. The forecast cost to completion for all 
current railway works is still within the US$9.4 billion 
original budget. 
 
A particular aspect of the QRM sessions for the new 
railway projects was the emphasis given to site safety, 
including when necessary a dressing-down of the 
senior management personnel in attendance on safety 
matters. Together with regular safety audits of all sites, 
these activities contributed to the impressive overall 
safety records achieved by West Rail, with only one 
fatal accident throughout the entire project. The 
original incident rate of 1.6 reportable accidents per 
100,000 hours work at the end of the project had been 
brought down to about 1 per 100,000. The 
construction industry in Hong Kong at large has had a 
bad safety track record over very many years, and the 
efforts being made to improve the situation have been 
significantly assisted by the West Rail performance. 
This has been taken forward and further improved on 
by the East Rail Extensions team. 
 
12. FINAL REMARKS 
Project management is undoubtedly an art, not a 
science, and relies heavily on people dynamics. The 
major railway projects successfully completed by 
KCRC during the past eight years, have again 
hammered home this point. But problems will be 
encountered, and part of the art is to find the best 
win-win solution by negotiation and compromise if 
necessary. This was the case with West Rail, when 
dealing with unexpected ground conditions. It was 
necessary to enter into supplemental agreements with 
sub-contractors. These agreements resulted in 
programme delays being recovered, such that 
completion was finally achieved in accordance with 
the programme dates set in 1997 at the 
commencement of the project. Time against cost, and 
value for money was the over-riding objective when 
negotiating supplemental agreements, in the light of 
unforeseen events encountered during construction.  
   
Wrapping up major problems has enabled the final 
account process for the new railway works to move 
forward speedily, and with a few exceptions 
contractors have accepted final valuations of work 
done and payments have been made accordingly.  
 
Thank you for the opportunity of being with you today. 
I hope that this highlight of some of the lessons learnt 
by KCRC, in successfully completing major railway 
projects, will be helpful during your future careers.  
